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Institutional Reforms at Main Canal Level and Their Water Allocation 












Since independence in 1991 in Uzbekistan, the collective farming system has gradually been 
broken up into  numerous individual small and medium size farms.  The existing water 
management arrangements proved unworkable in this new context, with individuals rapidly 
coming into conflict over distribution.  Reforms in the water sector have lagged those in 
agriculture, further contributing to disruption in irrigation service to farmers. Therefore, in 2003,  
the Uzbek government adopted a basin approach to water management, with a major focus on 
improving water distribution through restructuring management along hydrographic boundaries. 
Before this, the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) and its partner the Scientific 
Information Center of Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (SIC ICWC) pilot-tested this 
approach for three years, in conjunction with strong water user participation in the South 
Ferghana canal in  Ferghana Valley (94,000 ha). This huge main canal previously traversed 11  
administrative districts, resulting in a highly fragmented and competitive management structure.  
The International Water Management Institute (IWMI) and its local partner, the Scientific 
Information Center (SIC) introduced two institutional innovations at the main canal level 
throuogh the IWRM FV project
7. First was the establishment of new hydrographic Canal 
Management Organizations (CMOs). The second was the establishment of Canal Water 
Committees (CWCs) for each of the three pilot canals. Although the status and mandate of the 
CWCs are still under discussion, they provide a higher level of representation and influence 
than the WUAs at watercourse level. 
 
By introducing these two new approaches, the project claimed that more equitable water 
distribution in the pilot canals were achieved. This paper presents an assessment of the impacts 
of these institutional changes on water distribution in one instance – the South Ferghana Canal 
(SFC), in Uzbekistan. The impact of the changes was measured in terms of the  adequacy and 
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equity of water delivery to all users. The paper also examines how institutional changes at 
higher level have affected agricultural productivity.  
 
The water distribution for periods of  before and after project interventions were measured 
through temporal and spatial analysis of delivery performance ratio (DPR). The results suggest 
that there are real changes that have had a positive impact on uniformity of water distribution, 
reducing the excessive water delivery, a common practice in the pre-intervention period. The 
weighted average of DPR for the pre-intervention period was estimated at 1.97, but reduced  
the intervention period to 1.20, which is classed as moderate water distribution performance .  
The IWRM Ferghana intervention has also resulted in an unexpected decline in water delivery, 
increasing the number of cases with extremely low DPRs.  This normally happens towards the 
end of the crop season and could reflect poor planning of actual needs at the start of the 
season. A spatial improvement in DPRs was observed from values fluctuating  from 1.08 to 9.56 
pre-project, falling into the range of 1.00 and 1.53, afterwards. Better timeliness was also 
observed. We conclude that, due to the project interventions, the number of excessive water 
delivery cases was considerably reduced and moderate water distribution performance 
achieved over a broader area.  
 
To assess the impacts of IWRM Ferghana project interventions on water users, two surveys 
were conducted in one of the exemplary  WUAs  located along the South Ferghana canal. The 
survey indicated that there are positive changes in timeliness and adequacy of water supply to 
water users, though problems with stability of water level in some watercourses still persist. The 
yields for major crops such as cotton and wheat in the SFC command area revealed no overall 
changes during the intervention period. However, spatial differences in crop yields between 
canal reaches have greatly decreased. The average depth of water applied in different units of 
SFC became more uniform in the intervention period. This is a very good indicator of the impact 
of institutional changes on water distribution.  
A major concern though remains about the sustainability of new institutions, especially those 
representing the water users. The Canal Water Committees (CWCs) can play an important role 
in scheme management to ensure more equal water distribution. This function has been so far 
operationalized through regular coordination between the CMO and the CWC on 10-day water 
distribution schedules. The CWC represents water users (both irrigation and non-irrigation) in all 
canal management matters through democratically elected representatives. However, due to 
the large size of SFC’s command area, this single umbrella body may struggle to be effective in 
the future. Therefore, we propose that additional CWC’s should be  formed at each hydrounit of 
SFC and then federated at the entire canal level.    3
 
The analysis confirms that even partial changes in irrigation water management of the countries 
in transition, especially in Central Asia can bring positive changes in water distribution . 
However, these changes have greater weight in voicing water users’ needs when making water 
distribution decisions at the main canal level than in using water more effectively at field level. It 
is worth noting also that SFC is located in Uzbekistan, a country featuring strong central 
government control and a quota system in agricultural production. So proper groundwork and 
consultation in the form of well-planned social mobilization campaigns among major 
stakeholders can effect changes that really work, even if the overall agro-economic system is 
distorted.  
 
For the last 10-12 years, Uzbekistan has been trying to create more effective farming system 
through its land reform and the replacement of former collective farms. However, the water 
sector has so far been failing to keep pace. This case study provides a concrete and detailed 
example of a model that has great potential to be applied to the enormous number of main 
canals servicing the Ferghana Valley, and in other systems where hundreds of main canals like 
SFC exist in Uzbekistan and elsewhere in Central Asia.  The replication of  the experience of 
this study in those canals in Uzbekistan and in Central Asia as a  whole will bring long-expected 
sustainability in irrigation water management. The approach described in this study will help to 
equalize irrigation water distribution to the large numbers of new, individual new water users, 
emerging due to agricultural and land reforms. The inclusion of water users will also bring more 
transparent practices and as result reduce the transaction costs of water management. The 
implementation of the above approach on a basin scale will require a huge effort to mobilize 
water users and re-organize the irrigation water management structure. Water allocation 
approaches should also be revised with more inclusion of water users’ voice in the process. 






















Irrigated agriculture contributes much to food security and improved livelihoods of the rural 
population around the world (FAO, 2005). Occupying only 17% of the total cropland, irrigated 
agriculture produces more then 40% of the world’s food. However, the number of people dying 
from hunger and living in extreme poverty is not declining (UN, 2005). At the same time the 
development of new water resources and land for irrigated agriculture in order to increase food 
production is increasingly less economically, environmentally and socially viable. Real changes 
in irrigated water use can be achieved through improving the productivity of existing available 
water resources. In Central Asia, the contemporary water crises are mainly institutional in nature 
rather than resource-based (Dukhovniy and Sokolov.2005). Therefore, institutional interventions 
to improve irrigation water management are a pre-requisite for increasing the productivity of 
limited water resources and feeding millions in the region.  
 
Irrigated agriculture is one of the cornerstones of the Uzbek economy, contributing 30-35% to its 
national gross domestic product.  60% of the region’s population rely on agriculture, with few 
alternatives for off farm employment (UNDP, 2006). Therefore,  both the social and  economic 
health of the country is very much dependent on the sustainable development of irrigated 
agriculture at least for the next 10-15 years.  
 
However, 90% of the water consumed in irrigation in Uzbekistan comes from transboundary 
rivers, such as Syr Darya and Amu Darya. Only a fraction of the water resources used in the 
country (< 10%) is sourced within its territory.  A complex and rigidly controlled irrigation 
network was constructed and upgraded during Soviet times, but after its collapse, emergent  
national agencies took over the management and exploitation of  previously shared natural 
resources. The extent and trajectory of  irrigation water sector developments in Uzbekistan 
could have  far-reaching consequences for interstate water resources availability and 
management. 
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Objectives and Scope 
 
The principles of IWRM and River basin management include seeking coordinated development 
and management of land and water resources (GWP-TAC, 2000, Mostert et al. 2000).  They 
can readily be extended to management of other resources in a basin (Svendsen et al. 2005).  
Water management is a socio-technical process, arising from the interactions between water 
users, technology and water availability (Mollinga. 1998). Water management reforms to 
address emerging water crises started in the mid 20
th century in different countries around the 
world (Brewer et al. 1999; Vermillion and Sagardoy 1999; AHT and WAPDA 2001; 
Bandaragoda and Memon 1997; Starkloff and Zaman 1999).  
 
However, the water reforms and implementation of IWRM principles in the post Soviet transition 
economies have not been well studied. The project “Integrated Water Resources Management 
in Ferghana Valley” is the first attempt to introduce water sector reforms in Central Asia, with a 
specific focus on the irrigation sector. 
 
In 2003 Uzbekistan began a programme of water sector reform, introducing a hydrographic 
approach where water resources are to be managed at basin level and not by the provinces 
(Decree #320 by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, issued in 2003).  Prior 
to the Uzbek water reforms,  in 2002 International Water Management Institute (IWMI) with its 
local partners began the Integrated Water Resources Management in Ferghana Valley project 
(IWRM FV). The Project was implemented in three pilot areas: the South Ferghana Canal in 
Uzbekistan, the Khojabaqirgon Canal in Tajikistan, and the Aravan-Akbura Canal in Kyrgyzstan. 
Along each of these primary canals, one Water Users Association (WUA) and several field plots 
were selected to test interventions and monitor resulting changes.  The Project set out to 
improve the effectiveness of water resources management in the Ferghana Valley with the 
objectives of the project defined as follows: 
  To introduce and pilot test Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) 
approaches and water user participation in the Ferghana Valley; and 
  To demonstrate options to increase water productivity at all levels of the production 
system. 
 
Institutionally, the project brought two innovations at the main canal level. First was the 
establishment of new hydrographic Canal Management Organizations (CMOs). The second was 
the establishment of Canal Water Committees (CWCs) for each of the three pilot canals. 
Although the status and mandate of the CWCs are still under discussion, they provide a higher 
level of representation and influence than the more common WUAs at watercourse level.   6
 
By introducing these two new approaches, the project achieved more equitable water 
distribution in the pilot canals. This paper presents an assessment of the impacts these 
institutional changes had on water distribution in one instance – the South Ferghana Canal 
(SFC), in Uzbekistan. The impact of the changes was measured in terms of the  adequacy and 
equity of water delivery to all users. The paper also examines how institutional changes at 
higher level have affected agricultural productivity.  
 
This paper tries to evaluate the impact of institutional changes brought by Uzbek government 
decree on introduction of hydrographic water management in 2003 and IWRM FV
8 project 
interventions in terms of water allocation and crop yield levels (especially in the tail-end areas) 
at the selected  pilot South Ferghana canal , in Uzbekistan.  
 
The water distribution performance and crop yields analyses for the  South Ferghana canal 
command area was undertaken for two different periods:  (i) before the interventions (2000-
2001) when water allocation was managed administratively and (ii) after the institutional 
changes (2002-2005) when the hydrographic principles and user participation in water 
management were introduced.  
 
Analysis of institutional changes are problematic, after all, this is no laboratory experiment and 
institutions are humanly devised and individually perceived.  Authors recognizes limitations of 
such analysis where “harware” indicators , such as water delivery, allocation are very much 
shaped and influenced by social interactions of different groups. The data collected for very 
narrow period, only five years  may also be not enough to produce convincing 
recommendations. However, approach and method used in this paper could be very good 
methodology on assessing institutional interventions.  
Project Area: Ferghana Valley and South Ferghana Canal 
 
The Ferghana Valley is located in the southeast of the Central Asian region and the eastern part 
of the Aral Sea Basin. It is almost entirely surrounded by mountains (the Ala-Tau Range in the 
North, the Tian Shan Mountains in the East and the Alai Mountains in the South), with the 
exception of the narrow western opening through which the Syr Darya River drains into the 
lower basin of the Aral Sea. The larger central part of the valley falls within the Republic of 
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Uzbekistan, while the northern and eastern fringes are located in the Kyrgyz Republic and a 
small area in the valley’s west and southwest belongs to the Republic of Tajikistan.  
 
Insert: Figure 1. Map of the Ferghana Valley 
 
The Ferghana Valley forms the upper to mid-reach of the Syr Darya River Basin, which flows 
from the confluence of the Naryn and Kara Darya rivers.  
 
The average temperature in the valley is 13.1°C, ranging from -8°C to 3°C in January and 17°C 
to 36°C in July. Annual precipitation ranges from 109 mm to 502 mm whereas evaporation 
ranges from 1133 mm to 1294 mm throughout the Ferghana valley. The long–term (1970-2000) 
average annual precipitation for the SFC command area is 175 mm. During the study period 
(1999-2004), precipitation rates were mostly higher than the long-term average, having the 
highest value of 330 mm in 2003 and the lowest of 150 mm in 2000. The effective precipitation 
rates are equal of only 15-20% of total values. The main reason for low effective precipitation 
rates is that they occur in  winter. The potential evopotranspiration for the study zone is 1800-
1850 mm (Mukhamedjanov et al.2004) and thus effective  precipitation contributes very little to 
total water supply (only 2-3%). Therefore, the authors have ignored the role of precipitation in 
water supply for the study years.  
 
South Ferghana canal is located in the south part of the valley (figure 1) and was built in 1936 
and then reconstructed and extended In 1940. The SFC is135 km long, with 60 km located in 
Andijan Province of Uzbekistan and 85 km is in Ferghana Province. It is lined from head to tail 
and receives water from Andijan reservoir. The inflow to the canal is 100 m
3/s.  Total irrigated 
area under the SFC command is 83,884 ha of which 26,983 ha are located in Andijan Province 
and 53,155 ha are in Ferghana Province and some 3,746 ha fall in Kyrgyzstan . The Karkidon 
Off-Channel Reservoir is used during the irrigation season as an additional source of supply to 
SFC.  The major crops grown in the SFC command area are cotton and wheat, which occupy 
28% of total irrigated area, compared to orchards – 26% and kitchen gardens – 19% (table 1) 
 
Insert: Table 1. Land distribution and cropping patterns by hydrounits of SFC  
(Syrdarya-Sokh BISMO, 2004) 
 
Background information on irrigation and water management in Uzbekistan and 
need for institutional reforms  
   8
Uzbekistan has a very long agricultural history which, according to Russian sources, which goes 
back to 2000 BC. The first irrigation infrastructure discovered by historians and archeologists 
indicates that people who lived in what is now Uzbekistan used small water reservoirs and a 
complicated network of irrigation canals as early as 1000 BC (Bartold, 1970; 
Mukhamedjanov,1976). However, until the mid 20
th century, irrigated agriculture was mainly for 
subsistence needs of the local population. Lack of budget and the absence of engineering 
capacity were limiting factors to the development of large scale irrigation in Central Asia.  
 
In the 1960’s, the Soviet government started its “virgin land development” program, which 
included construction of the reservoirs and canal networks and the  development of millions of 
hectares of desert and virgin lands. In the old irrigated systems, such as the Ferghana Valley, 
some new main canals were constructed to improve water availability for irrigated agriculture. 
The principal performance indicator of irrigated agriculture was the amount of cotton produced 
per unit  area and the efficient use of resources was never an issue.  
 
During the soviet time the infrastructure was operated and maintained by centralized, 
hierarchical organizations, branches of the Ministry of Reclamation Amelioration and Water 
Management. Water management was under political-administrative control and inter-district 
(hydrographic) canal management organizations were created in only a few cases (Academy of 
Science of Uzbekistan. 1970). The sole aim of the administration was timely delivery of water to 
satisfy the demands of cotton growing state farms. Because water management organizations 
were organized territorially, it was rare to have equitable water distribution in practice.  
 
Under Soviet water management, conflicts were handled by administrative procedures such as 
giving priority to units with the best performing agricultural production quotas. 
 
The main canals (“magistralniy” in Russian) in Uzbekistan are mostly lined or compacted very 
well to minimise seepage losses. The majority of main canals receive water from reservoirs or 
weirs  and are operated under an arranged demand schedule. Every major water distribution 
point on the main canal is equipped with regulating gates (manual or electric), discharges are 
measured regularly. The canal gate openings are based on water demands collated from users. 
The requests are collected every 3 days and canal manager prepares schedule of gate 
openings. However, operators can make immediate changes to schedules, if requested by 
higher level managers or in case of accidents. In lift irrigation,  the reliability of the water supply 
depends on the availability of electricity. Managers of the main canal and its service areas 
(“gidrouchastka” in Russian) communicate with each other by radios which are now outdated. 
Managers of the main canal and its service areas (“gidrouchastka” in Russian) communicate   9
with each other by radios which are now outdated,  information on water flow and changes in 
gate openings are communicated with delays.  Therefore, the canal masters (head of 
“gidrouchastka”) in every reach have relative independence to make decisions on water 
distribution and fluctuations due to the ad-hoc changes made in the different reaches of the 
main canal result in unreliable and unequal water distribution.  
 
Post independence: impacts of agricultural reforms on irrigation sector 
After independence, almost all states of Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, retained the soviet 
model for water management. At the same time, some economic changes occurred, such as 
charging water users a part of the O&M cost, through creation of water users associations. 
State support was uneven and differed from country to country and it also declined with time.  
 
Until the mid-1990’s, a secondary canal typically supplied water to one large collective farm. 
The agricultural reforms begun in early the 1990 has greatly increased the numbers of water 
users at on-farm level. Irrigation water management arrangements for collective farming system 
were incapable of responding to requests for water from so many individual users.  Water users 
started to compete for water and water use plans designed for a collective system were 
abolished, further increasing widespread water theft and  erratic supply.   
 
Major changes started to take place in the agricultural sector when large collective farms were 
broken up into small farms (Ul Hassan et al. 2005). The formation of the numerous smaller farm 
units, sharing the inherited on-farm infrastructure led to further deterioration of the water 
distribution discipline and equity (Abdullaev, 2006). The reaction of the Central Asian states, 
including Uzbekistan, was to launch a WUA programme based on hydraulic boundaries of the 
former on-farm irrigation system. However, the main irrigation systems in Uzbekistan were still 
managed territorially by the state.  
 
 
After the disintegration of collective farms into numerous individual farming units, the workload 
of the WMOs increased tremendously.  Water management at the farm level, previously 
handled by collectives has been abandoned. Since the financial and human resources  of 
WMOs have not been increased after agricultural reforms, they could not sign individual water 
contracts with the greatly increased nymbers of water users at tertiary level, resulting in a loss of 
discipline and  neglect of roles by both parties.  
 
State funding for on-farm water infrastructure of collective farms rapidly declined after de-
collectivization of agricultural production,  leading to rapid degradation (Abdullaev et al. 2006),.    10
 
Until 2003, the management of major irrigation canals and water reservoirs was solely under 
state control. All irrigation infrastructure at the main system level was managed territorially, 
through provincial and district level water management organizations. Each of territorial unit 
(district, province) had state production quotas for cotton and wheat. As water was such a 
crucial factor, each governor tried to appropriate more water for his or her district.  The resulting 
territorial fragmentation of water resources management led to inequitable water distribution and 
head-tail water disputes (IWMI 2002, SIC 2003).  
 
On July 21, 2003, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan issued a decree (#320) 
to reform the water management system by transferring water management from an 
administrative-territorial system to a basin approach. The main goal of this reform was to 
consolidate water management through the establishment  Water Users Associations (WUAs) 
and  Canal Management Organizations (CMO’s), operating within single hydraulic units, in order 
to ensure equal access to water for different users and improve water use efficiency.    
Institutional Reforms/ project interventions  
Prior to the project, SFC was managed by the WMOs of  two provinces, Andijan and Ferghana. 
Each WMO developed separate water use plans, which were submitted to the Andijan Water 
Reservoir Management, which is under direct management of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Water Management. The water use plans of the SFC then were adjusted  by Andijan Water 
reservoir authority in consultation with Andijan and Ferghana WMO has to match the water 
availability in the reservoir. The adjustments are made based on water availability in the 
reservoir. The water availabilities of different basins and water systems (canals, reservoirs) are 
forecast by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources  based on information from the 
central office of hydrometeorology services of Uzbekistan. The hydrometeorology service 
releases the probability of precipitation for the different zones of the country every 6 months.  
The WMO’s in each province had full control over all water management in their jurisdiction.  
During the cropping season (April- September) and winter (October- March), water was 
released based on these plans. However, frequent disturbances due to technical problems 
(damage to reservoir gates or pumps) and external administrative influence made 
implementation ineffective in practice. The local administrations in charge of the agricultural 
production frequently requested WMOs to release more water to the units under their control. 
Due to the administrative hierarchy, the WMOs were forced to obey the local administration, 
resulting in considerable deviations from the stated plan. In order to adjust the water allocation 
to the realities of the administrative system, the managers of both parts of the SFC developed 
an arranged demand process of water ordering and delivery. The primary water users submitted   11
their water requirements every 3 days to the nearby canal hydrounit. The heads of the 
hydrounits prepared the consolidated requests and submitted them to the dispatch centers of 
the Andijan and Ferghana part of the SFC. The dispatch centers of the SFC then would send 
the requests for the water to the Andijan reservoir management.  
 
In the absence of good governance structures and the exclusion of water users from water 
management, invariably resulted in mistrust between the two territories of the SFC. The water 
managers in Ferghana province suspected that Andijan (upper reach) withdrew more water than 
planned or requested. In turn, the Andijan reach accused Ferghana of excessive water use due 
to the availability of water from internal Karkidon reservoir (200 MCM) (personal communication, 
Poziljon).   
 
Figure 2
9 presents the SFC water management structure prior to project intervention . The 
regulator at the head of the SFC (40 km) belonged to Andijan WMO and the boundary with 
Ferghana lay at the regulator at 60 km RD (till Palvantash hydrounit).  
 
Insert Figure 2. 
 
The allocation of water shares (quotas ) was set by MAWR and communicated to the provincial 
departments. The provincial departments then forwarded the water allocation agreement to the 
district departments of MAWR. All the district departments of MAWR had to sign seasonal water 
delivery agreements with the primary water users (collective farms and cooperatives). At the 
same time Andijan Reservoir was managed by MAWR and received regular requests from SFC 
managers to release water during the season. Water had to be released from the reservoir to 
the Andijan Provincial Department of MAWR, including the share for Ferghana Province. The 
Andijan provincial department then had the responsibility to deliver this to Ferghana province.  
SFC management in Ferghana had to sign an agreement on water delivery with the Ferghana 
Provincial Department of MAWR.  District departments of MAWR had to sign agreements with 
hydrounits of the SFC, and water users signed the agreement with district departments of 
MAWR. The  canal managers developed the schedule of water release for Karkidon Reservoir 
based on need and availability during the irrigation season. The given schedule had to be 
agreed with Ferghana Provincial Department of MAWR and submitted to MAWR for final 
approval. At the same time replenishment and water releases were carried out entirely by the 
central dispatch center of MAWR. Thus, the organizational management structure was based 
completely on a command-administrative (top-down) approach, which was complicated by 
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administrative-territorial competition over the water. The rigid and awkward procedures 
neglected local realities and resulted in inefficient water management (SIC.2002). 
 
Water Management in South Ferghana Canal after project intervention  
In 2003, the Cabinet of Ministries of Uzbekistan issued a Decree (July 21, 2003, №320) on 
transforming the water management from territorial to hydrographic principles. This was marked 
as a start of gradual water management reform in Uzbekistan.  As a first step toward the 
implementation of this decree, the Ferghana Central Dispatch Center for the Main Canal 
Management Organizations was established in the Ferghana Valley (Figure 3).  As a 
replacement for the former provincial water management organizations (Ferghana, Andijan), 
two irrigation system management organizations (BISMO) the Syrdarya-Sokh (Ferghana 
Province) and the Naryn-Karadarya (Andijan Province) were created.  
 
 
Insert Figure 3 
 
The two BISMO’s were responsible for irrigation water management.  The SFC management 
was merged for both parts of the canal and a new Canal Management Organization (CMO) was 
created. The new CMO took over the management of the whole canal command area, 
excepting the feeder canal from Andijan reservoir and a portion of the end of the SFC (15 km or 
8000 ha).  The CMO of the SFC was located in the middle of the canal. Therefore, the SFC 
became a bulk water supplier to the BISMOs, which were responsible for distribution to primary 
water users. Even after the reforms, water management remained semi-administrative, as water 
users still had to sign agreements on water delivery with district branches of the BISMO, which 
continued to sign an agreement on water delivery with SFC. SFC had to develop a schedule for 
water use from Karkidon Reservoir but had to agree with the Central Dispatcher Center and 
BISMOs and have approval of the central office of MAWR. After long  negotiation Uzbek 
authorities in 2006 have transferred the whole canal (including the feeder part and the tail) to 
the CMO of SFC. However, the data considered here do not extend to 2006.  
 
 
Water Management in South Ferghana Canal after project intervention  
  
This project brought two major changes to the water management of the SFC: (i) full 
introduction of the hydrographic principle through merging of two separate canal management 
units into one and (ii) formation of the Canal Water Committee (later named as Water Users   13
Union) for the involvement of the water users in the governance of water management at the 
main canal level (Figure 4). 
 
The introduction of hydrographic water management at SFC went smoothly; the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Water Management of Uzbekistan, the project’s major partner, issued a decree 
for a unified SFC Canal management unit (CMO). The new unified organization took over from 
the two separate units before the end of 2002.  Organizationally, the CMO has four major 
departments:  (i) the dispatch group, (ii) the O&M group, (iii) the construction group and (iv) the 
finance and the administrative group.  It has re-deployed the former staff of the two separate 
WMOs and has been allocated the same budget as the two  units had before. All the capital 
equipment (tractors, cars and excavators etc.) were transferred to the new CMO. The second 
project intervention was more social in nature and almost revolutionary by the  paternalistic 
standards of Central Asian water management Inclusion of water user’s into the governance of 
the system was very new and challenging. 
 
Insert Figure 4 
 
The institutional changes can be considered over three short periods: (1) 2002 was a 
preparatory year, when stakeholders were informed about upcoming institutional changes. In 
this period  the CMO was created; (ii) in 2003, new canal management was strengthened, and 
staffed with former workers of the two WMOs and also received adequate funding for O&M. The 
CMO started to take control over water distribution in all hydrounits of the canal. At this stage, a 
new body, which represented water users – a CWC - was launched. The CWC Council started 
to participate regularly at the CMO meetings as an advisory body; (iii) in 2004, several training 
sessions were conducted for the CWC Council and the CMO. The Council of CWC became 
stronger and started to share their concerns over water distribution. The process of institutional 
change was relatively rapid. Within one year, SFC management was fully transformed from 
territorial to hydrographic principles. 
 
 
Methods and Materials  
Concept of institutional changes/reforms 
 
Irrigation water management, which is focus of this paper, goes beyond technological process, 
successful irrigation management deals with not only water infrastructure but also water user 
and organizational interactions (Coward.1980). Already for few decades many countries in Asia 
with generous assistance from international donors trying to improve their irrigation   14
management institutions. However, due to limitations of state mode of irrigation management 
progress in institutional reforms are limited (Shivakoti et.al. 2005).  Uniqueness of water reforms 
in Central Asian countries predetermined by their common soviet history and quite striking 
differences at post indpedence path.  
 
Conventional view on institutional changes describes its occurrence due to two reasons: (i) 
increase efficiencies or (ii) improve equity (North and Thomas.1970, Binswanger and 
Ruttan.1978). Bromley (1989) argues that institutional changes are also motivated by (i) 
reallocation of economic opportunity and (ii) distribution of economic gains.  The institutional 
changes can be classified from supply-demand perspective (Feeny.1993).  Demand for 
institutional changes in irrigation sector presents water users needs for improved and 
sustainable services.  The supply perspective presents states role on institutional changes 
where it plays major role. The active role of state in institutional changes decreases transaction 
costs (North.1986).  Therefore, it is important to describe and analyze the results of Uzbek 
water reforms that present supply perspective on institutional changes. In other hand 
international donors, funding agencies could promote suppliers of institutional change through 
identification, pilot testing and disseminating of “best” practices of institutions (North.1990).  
Interventions made by IWRM FV project is good illustration of suppliers for institutional changes.  
 
The institutional changes in the irrigation sector can be attributed to legal, policy and 
organizational interventions (Saleth et al. 2005).  Uzbek government reforms and IWRM FV 
project interventions both contributed to to organisational change, e.g. the  of hydrographic 
water management units, governance bodies that represent water users, transforming on-farm 
water management to WUAs.  The conecept of organizational changes are very well studied for 
context of developing countries (Saleth.2004, Giordano et al.2007).  However, results of 
organizational changes are country specific and require country based studies.  
 
Assessment of Water supply performance of SFC 
Performance assessment in irrigation and drainage can be defined as the systematic 
observation, documentation and interpretation of activities related to irrigated agriculture with 
the objective of continuous improvement (Bos et al. 2005).  Small and Svendsen (1992) identify 
four different types of performance assessment: (i) operations, (ii) accountability, (iii) 
interventions and (iv) sustainability. A considerable amount of work has been undertaken in the 
past 10 years to develop a framework for irrigation performance assessment. Irrigation 
performance indicators cover the traditional aspects related to adequacy, equity and reliability of 
the water service (Wolters 1992, Murray – Rust and Snellen, 1993, Bos et.al.1994). The   15
evaluation of irrigation water use has undergone major changes in the last 20-25 years. It 
started as an assessment of classical irrigation efficiencies (Bos and Nugteren. 1974,) and 
developed to define performance indicators (Bos et al.1994) and a framework of water 
accounting at the regional scale .  Bos et al. (1994, 2005), after thorough research, suggested a 
package of indicators which are related to the performance of (i) the water delivery system, (ii) 
the environment and (iii) the irrigated agricultural economic system. For the last decade more 
advanced systems like benchmarking, designed to compare performance across systems, 
within defined contexts have emerged as new approaches (IPTRID/WB/IWMI).  
 
The main performance indicator used in this study is the delivery performance ratio (DPR), 
which quantifies satisfaction of demand (Bos et al. 2005).   DPR is calculated as the ratio of 
actual delivered volume of water to that planned (equation 1).  Uniformity was determined as the 
temporal change of DPR and equity was measured as spatial change of DPR.  
 
DPR=   Wactual/Wplanned         (1) 
 
Where: DPR   – delivery performance ratio  
Wactual     – actual water delivery in the diversion point in a given decade (cubic meters)  
Wplanned  – planned water delivery in a given decade (in cubic meters) 
 
FAO (1986) distinguishes three levels of performance in irrigation water delivery: (1) deficient 
water supply (when DPR< 0.8), (2) moderate performance (0.8<DPR<1.2) and (3) excessive 
supply (DPR>1.2).  A system with perfect water management should have spatially and 
temporally similar water distribution coefficients. South Ferghana canal  receives water from 
Andijan Reservoir and has a very secure water supply. Therefore, one would expect that good 
management should provide temporally and spatially uniform DPR. A frequency distribution was 
calculated and DPRs for the study period (2000-2005) were arranged into three groups 
corresponding with deficient, moderate and excessive performance (Figure 9).  
 
Actual water deliveries (Wactual) used in DPR calculations were measured 3 times a day within 
the service area of each secondary canal and daily averages determined. The established 
seasonal planning system in Central Asia operates on a 10-day period (a ‘decade’), so that 
each month is divided into 3 decades.  Planned water deliveries (Wplanned)  were taken from 
water use plans prepared for each season for every hydrounit of the canal.  
 
The main goal of this study is to assess impacts of  institutional changes on water distribution 
performance and crop yields in the South Ferghana Canal command area of Uzbekistan, 
Central Asia.  This was undertaken for two different periods:  (i) before the interventions (2000-  16
2001) when water allocation was managed administratively and (ii) after the institutional 
changes (2002-2005) when the hydrographic principles and user participation in water 
managenet were introduced.  
 
Water User surveys 
Measurements of canal discharges provide information on how an irrigation system (network) 
performs, but tell us little about the performance of an irrigation and drainage scheme as a 
whole (Bos et al. 2005).  Questionnaire surveys play an important role in diagnostic assessment 
of irrigation. From questionnaires, important information on service levels, social organization 
and conflicts can be obtained. A well–designed survey based on statistical methods can provide 
a strong quantitative base for analysis.  
 
The WUA surveyed - WUA “Akbarabad” - is located in the command area of South Ferghana 
Canal. The findings of 2 sequential surveys (Yakubov and Matyakubov, 2004; Yakubov, 2004) 
conducted in 2003 and 2004 have been used to analyze and understand water users’ 
perceptions and attitudes towards the changes that occurred in water management before and 
after project interventions. Both surveys were designed and conducted at farm household level 
as structured interviews to collect a set of data on farmers’ initial attitudes and perceptions with 
regard to a range of water management and water use issues and track any changes and 
dynamics throughout the project. One key issue analyzed in the surveys was the perceived 
change in the quality of irrigation services in terms of adequacy, timeliness and stability of water 
supply.  
 
The population for both surveys in WUA “Akbarabad” included all households living and working 
their main land parcels and/or backyard gardens within the WUA service area. The service area 
of this Uzbek WUA, when first established in March, 2003 was 2820 ha, including 33 proprietary 
farms of about 13 ha, 3 huge cooperative farms (locally called shirkats
10) and 5 villages. A 
stratified random sample of 60 local agricultural water users were interviewed. The sampling 
was limited to household heads stratified by the location of their main land holdings along 
watercourse and distributary canals (head, middle or tail). Additionally local farmers were 
stratified by farm type: shirkats, medium- to small-size commercial farms and tiny subsistence 
backyard enterprises.  
 
When conducting the second survey, every effort was made to include all farmers from the first 
sample, with 55 farmers out of the baseline 60 being re-interviewed.  
                                                 
10 Large cooperative farms in Uzbekistan - Shirkat Farms (shirkat kho’jaligi, in Uzbek) -  are still quasi-governmental 
in nature though formally collectively owned by their members; the term ‘Proprietary Farm’ has also different 
renditions in Uzbekistan (fermer kho’jaligi, in Uzbek, i.e. Sole Proprietary Farm).    17
Water Supply to WUAs, Water Productivity and Crop yields  
In order to assess the impacts of the project interventions at lower levels (WUAs and individual 
water users) the DPR at the head for the WUA service area was assessed for the pre-
intervention (2001-2002) and project periods (2003-2005).  WUA Akbarabad was formed in 
2003 therefore data on DPR for pre-intervention periods are given as an average of the 4 
secondary canals, which were under Kuva WMO management in 2001-2002. The command 
areas of secondary canals and number of outlets closely match those of WUA Akbarabad.The 
only thing changed were the number of water users after abolishment  of collective farms. 
Therefore comparison of pre- intervention  and intervention periods is based on data collected 
from secondary canals.  
Data on major crop yields (cotton and wheat) and actual water supply depth for canal command 
area were collected also for the study periods in order to assess the impacts of the IWRM 
Ferghana project.  
 
Analysis of institutional changes is problematic, after all, this is no laboratory experiment and 
institutions are devised through insight and experience and are individually perceived.  The 
authors recognize the limitations of such analysis where “hard” indicators, such as water 
delivery and allocation are very much shaped and influenced by social interactions of different 
groups. The data was collected for a relatively short period, only five years, and so may also be 
insufficient to make convincing recommendations. However, assessment of the performance of 
water reforms and the associated participatory management of irrigation remains rare, and this 
paper adresses this gap..  
 
Results and discussion 
Impact of project interventions on annual water distribution along the canal 
The SFC has 8 large hydrounits, from which the water is delivered to the primary water users 
(WUAs, collective farms).  A temporal analysis of DPR was carried out for all 8 hydrounits of the 
SFC. The period for the analysis was 2000-2005, the years 2000-2001 represent a baseline. 
The changes on SFC water management occurred after 2003. The DPR’s of these two periods 
are compared in Figure 5.  
 




Although  the period of comprasion is short the temporal analysis of the DPR (uniformity) of 
SFC indicated that there is a clear difference between the period of pre and after the project   18
interventions . The blue band in figure 5 is when the planned and actual water distribution match 
(0.8<DPR<1.2). The pre intervention (2000-2002) period is characterized by over supply of 
water.  Surprisingly, excessive water distribution occurred even during the year 2000, which was 
a year of water shortage in Central Asia. The weighted average of DPR for the pre intervention 
period is 1.97 with three peaks of DPR : 7.95 (April 2000), 6.21 (April 2001), 2.75 (September 
2001). Excessive water delivery against the planned allocation may be due to inappropriate 
water planning and implementation given the complexity of institutional arrangements. 
 
The period after the project intervention (post 2002) is characterized by a weighted average of 
DPR of 1.20, or moderate performance over the period 2003-2005. During the intervention 
period there were a few cases of extremely low DPR – 0.21 (September 2004) and 0.16 
(September 2005). However, these occurred at the end of the crop season therefore, should not 
seriously harm the irrigation water users but might have had negative impact on other water 
users. At present water use plans for canals are prepared for field irrigation only. Therefore 
needs of other sectors (gardens, drinking water, small industry) are not presented in water plans 
and not taken into account in water distribution process. This is a major issue for users, who 
derive much of their real and disposable income from gardens. 
 
The overall water distribution performance during the intervention period can be measured as 
moderate and in 2005 was mostly optimal.  Overall assessment of the uniformity of the water 
distribution in SFC for the pre- intervention and intervention periods shows that project 
interventions had an overall positive impact on water distribution uniformity. However , authors 
recognize that differences between pre- intervention and intervention period comprasions are 
based on only two year and three year data sets respectively.  
 
The temporal analysis of DPR (reliability) indicates the adequacy of the overall water distribution 
in the SFC pre and during the project intervention periods. In order to assess the equity of the 
water distribution for those periods, a spatial analysis of DPR  was conducted for the pre 
intervention period (administrative districts) and for the project period (hydrounits).  The analysis 
of spatial DPR (equity) shows significant statistical differences. The weighted averages of the 
water distribution coefficients for two periods are 1.97 and 1.2, respectively. This clearly 
corresponds to the weighted averages of the temporal analysis of water distribution coefficients 
(table 2). 
 
Insert: Table 2. Descriptive statistics of spatial variations of DPR by districts (before 
IWRM interventions and water reforms 2000-2001) and hydrounits (after project 
interventions)   19
 
 
Table 2 is divided into two groups:  i) administrative districts in head to tail order; ii) hydrounits, 
also given in head to tail order. The mean DPRs  for the pre-intervention period are relatively 
homogeneous as far as Kuvasay district WMO (ranging 1.08-1.46), which is located at the 
middle of the SFC. However, the DPR  at the Kuvasay is 2.52 and significant fluctuations occur 
below the Kuvasay. Thus average DPR reduces to 0.97 at Okunbabaev and then reaches it is 
highest values in Oltiarik, Fargona and Yozyovon districts - 2.23, 4.28, and 3.07 respectively. 
This analysis indicates that the water distribution among the administrative districts located 
along the canal was very non-uniform during the pre-intervention period and the contrast 
between the mean values of upstream and downstream reaches of the canal is clear. The 
highest standard deviation of the DPR for pre intervention period was observed in the Kuvasay, 
Fargona and Yozyovon districts of the Ferghana province – 3.71, 9.56 and 2.34 respectively 
(figure 6). The same trend was retained for the coefficients of variance (13.79, 91.45, 5.50) and 
the standard error of means of the DPR (0.62, 1.59, 0.39). 
  
The unequal water distribution did not result in impaired water delivery to the tail end districts. 
Rather, the tail end users received more water than planned . The pre-intervention period can 
be characterized by very high DPR both spatially and temporally, highlighting significant over 
supply from the SFC.  
 
 
Insert: Figure 6. Spatial variation of statistical indicators (mean, standard deviation and 
standard error of means) of water distribution coefficients by districts of SFC (2000-2001 
before water reforms and institutional changes) 
 
After 2003, the variations of the mean values of DPR range between 1.00 and 1.53, indicating 
moderate water delivery performance (figure 7).  The highest standard deviations are observed 
in hydrounits 3 and 8, with values of 0.74 and 1.22 with similar patterns in standard deviation 
and standard error of the mean. However, the overall water distribution was more equitable,  as 
a result of the unification of the canal under hydrographic unified management and the active 
role played by water users following their representation in the CWC.  
 
 
Figure 7.Spatial variation of statistical indicators (mean, standard deviation and standard 
error of means) of water distribution coefficients by hydrounits of SFC (2002-2005 after 
water reforms and institutional changes) 
   20
 
The overall uniformity of the water distribution in SFC can be classified as good after project 
intervention. The frequency distribution of deficient, moderate and excessive classes along the 
SFC suggests a good result. The percentage of cases with excessive water distribution rose 
from 43 to 65% in 2000 and 2001, declined to 34% in 2002 and then increased to 56% in 2003 
before declining again to 47% (2004) and then to 7.6% in 2005 (figure 8).  
 
 
Figure 8. Temporal changes of frequency distribution percentage of deficient, moderate 
and excess cases of water allocation along SFC (2000-2005) 
 
 
The percentage of observations within the range of moderate DPR continued to increase 
steadily after the project intervention, from 38% in 2003 to 54% in 2005. This can be assessed 
as a positive impact. However, at the same time the deficient water supply cases also increased 
from 11% in 2003 to 37% in 2005.  This may be an indication of the increased control (some 
times excessive) by the water management unit of SFC.  It may very well be an attempt by 
CMO to reduce water use in the canal to raise water distribution performance. On the other 
hand, formation of water users associations (WUAs) along the canal has also contributed to 
more controlled water use at the farm level. There is a tendency to over-order in water use 
plans and this could also explain cases of deficient water supply.   
 
The analysis of the annual temporal and spatial water distribution in the SFC before and after 
the project indicates that there have been improvements in the water distribution. The pattern of 
temporal changes (uniformity) of water distribution clearly mirrors the interventions in SFC. In 
2000-2002, when the canal was managed territorially with no water user representation,  water 
supply was excessive. We conclude that the introduction of interventions to improve water 
management at SFC led to a reduction of excessive water delivery and increased  prevalence of  
moderate water distribution performance. However, the frequency of deficient delivery also 
increased, but occurred at end of the crop season and therefore “only” affected non-agricultural 
users. The non- agricultural water uses, communal water use, industrial consumption  and other 
users have a tiny demand in comparison to agriculture water use (3% in total water use).  
  
Impact of canal management interventions at lower levels on water users 
Linkages between water users and the Canal Water Committee  
Establishment of the Canal Water Committee (CWC) is an important water management 
innovation introduced in the region by the IWRM Ferghana project (SDC 2005).    21
 
The CWC in SFC was started with rapport building between the project and two major 
stakeholders: the state water management organization (CMO of SFC) and water users (WUAs 
and shirkats). The rapport building was conducted through regular meetings, at first, separately 
with each stakeholder group and later in joint meetings.  The second step involved social 
mobilization among water users. A group of local people with appropriate technical and social 
backgrounds, were selected and trained by the project staff to become social mobilisers. They  
visited WUAs, shirkats and private farmers  to explain the idea of including water users in the 
governance of water at the main canal level. In contrast to bringing the separately managed 
canal parts under single hydrographic management, nurturing the principles for water user 
representation and participation in the canal  governance took much longer. The stage by stage 
process of mobilizing stakeholders’ support from awareness building to consultation meetings 
through election of group representatives to the establishment of CWC) took almost 8 months.  
 
The third step was election of water users’ representatives from each hydrounit to the General 
Assembly of CWC. The elections were held  in each hydrounit of the SFC. Thus, one person 
from each hydrounit was elected to represent their interests in CWC. In many cases water users 
elected WUA and shirkat leaders to be their representatives - a clear indication that water users 
preferred those who are better connected to effectively deal with and voice their problems at the 
higher hierarchical level of the system. There are undoubtedly other explanations as well. 
 
At the General Assembly of CWC, these representatives then elected a Council of the Canal 
Water Committee to serve as a permanent body. The council is composed of one person from 
each hydrounit representing irrigation water users and one delegate from each non-irrigation 
user such as power generation, or drinking water utility. The canal manager (head of CMO) was 
also  elected as a member of the CWC Council.  
 
In the first meeting of the Council, the chairman and secretary were elected through open 
voting. The official documents of the CWC were sent to the Ministry of Justice for the 
registration as the representative (governing) body of the water users.  At present, the CWC is 
an advisory unit with no power of approval/disapproval, therefore its role and influence over 
water management issues is still limited. However, the appearance of water users’ 
representatives at every meeting of CMO has had an impact on the water management 
decisions taken to date.  The manager of the CMO has started to present water use and 
implementation plans to the Council. The CWC Council members mainly were concerned about 
equal and reliable water distribution in the SFC and how water use plans are specified for their 
respective hydrounits.    22
 
The cost of the CWC operation, such as regular meetings, travel cost of the Council Chairman, 
and salary of the secretary, were covered by the CMO budget. However, in order to provide 
more independence, the General Assembly of CWC announced the introduction of a fee which 
will be collected from all primary water users (WUAs and shirkats).  A major problem facing the 
CWC is the difficulty of representing numerous water users along such a large canal. At 
present, there are around 26 WUAs within the SFC command area. However, soon their 
numbers may be doubled or tripled.  In this situation, CWC may become another centralized 
and hierarchical body and may be ineffective in representing water users’ needs.  Therefore, the 
next step taken in 2006 was the establishment of CWC branches in each hydrounit of SFC.  
This allows to link numerous WUAs along canal with CWC. This will require huge social 
moilizaton among WUAs, canal staff and other water users.  
 
The major challenge in the immediate future concerns the status and mandate of the CWCs in 
combination with the establishment of CMO on the principles of hydrographic unity. The CWCs 
can play an important role in canal management as has been demonstrated by the project in 
terms of achieving a more equitable distribution of water. However, as the representative organ 
of the users and stakeholders in the command area of the canal, the CWC could play a much 
more distinct role in IWRM, such as: water allocation, drainage management, water quality, etc. 
Ultimately, the mandate of the CWC will very much depend on how all water related activities in 
the command area are financed. It could range from a pure consultative role to one where the 
CWC would have full control of the management of all the assets under its jurisdiction (SDC. 
2005).  
Water supply to Water Users Associations 
WUA “Akbarabad” when established in 2003 had 33 indvidual farms of 13 ha on average, 3 
huge quasi-state cooperative farms (locally called shirkats) and 5 villages populated by about 
16,000 people making up a total of 3609 households, with each one having a separate backyard 
garden. In the following year (2004), the number of individual farms increased to 45 as a result 
of continuing land reforms (with farmland of big shirkat farms being gradually parceled out to 
such new farms). The local WUA manages 4 secondary canals with a total of 105 off-takes. 
Major local farm types  include shirkat farms that cover thousands of hectares in the crop area 
and are shared by hundreds to thousands of farm workers; individual farms normally owned by 
one household with the farmland on long-term lease (up to 50 years) and ranging from 1 to 50 
ha; as well as tiny household-based backyard gardens (locally called dehqan farms, ranging 
from 0.10 to 0.15 ha on average). The basic crops grown are cotton and winter wheat on most 
commercial big- to medium-size farms, fruit orchards on medium- to small-size proprietary farms 
and vegetables in household kitchen gardens.   23
 
WUA Akbarabad receives water from hydrounit #5.  Before the WUA and CMO were formed, 
the water users received water through the Kuva district WMO in Ferghana province.  The 
number of water users, command area and state of the irrigation and drainage network makes 
Akbarabad a typical WUA in the SFC  command area  The assessment of the water delivery 
performance in WUA Akbarabad is a good illustration of the project’s  impact at on-farm level.  
DPRs for pre-intervention periods are given as an average of all 4 secondary canals, which in 
2001-2002 were under Kuva WMO management.  The DPRs over the pre-intervention period 
(2001-2002) were equal, that is the area received exactly the planned amount of water during 
the crop season.  In 2003, at the start of the IWRM interventions, the DPR declined to 0.91. In 
2004, it increased to 0.98 and then again declined to 0.93 in 2005 (figure 10).  This indicates 
that the water delivery performance has deteriorated after IWRM interventionsThe project team 
conducted a water user’s survey for the project intervention period in order to have a better 
understanding of what changes had occurred in water services. The next section of the paper 
reflects those responses.  
 
 
Figure 9. Adequacy of annual water supply in the WUA Akbarabad (2001-2005) 
 
Responses of water users on Irrigation Service 
A set of questions in a baseline and follow-up surveys was specifically designed to verify the 
quality of irrigation service and find out any relationships between the baseline year (2002) and 
subsequent years. The answers to these questions allow some judgment  on the quality of 
irrigation service in terms of its adequacy and timeliness. In particular, the following three 
measures were used: (1) the number of irrigations requested; (2) those actually received; and(3) 
those received on time. Thus, the ratio of (2) to (1) would define water adequacy while that of 
(3) to (2) timeliness of water delivery.  
Adequacy of Water Deliveries 
Comparison of the 2-years’ findings reveals that water deliveries to the water users remained 
quite adequate in both years - before and after the project (Table 3). Although there was little 
space for further improvement  there was a slight increase in water adequacy following the first 
year of project interventions.  
 
Insert: Table 3. Water Adequacy during the cropping season in WUA Akbarabad  
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Timeliness of Water Deliveries 
Good water supply alone, while satisfactorily meeting water demands in volumetric terms, is not 
sufficient to guarantee farmers a good irrigation service. The right timing of water supply also 
matters. Survey results show that the number of those who enjoyed timely service in WUA 
“Akbarabad” in 2003 considerably improved from the preceding year, from 40% to 71% (Table 
4).  
 
Insert: Table 4 Timeliness of Water Delivery during the cropping season in WUA 
Akbarabad  
 
Stability of Water Level in a Watercourse 
There was a considerable increase in the number of respondents who reported that water level 
in their watercourses was always stable and constant in 2003, compared to the year before 
(Table 5). On the other hand there was also an increase in the number of those who 
experienced constant problems with the water level.  Among the main reasons for lack of 
stability in water level, respondents noted that there are many water users and lack of discipline 
and order among tiny kitchen garden owners when distributing water. This might have been due 
to the WUA’s initial preoccupation with meeting mostly the bigger farms’ needs without much 
regard to the needs of smaller water users such as family plots and kitchen gardens resulting in 
tampering with WUA delivery schedules to make sure they have enough water.  
 
Insert: Table 5. Stability of Water Level in the Watercourse during the Cropping Season in 
WUA Akbarabad 
 
Overall, though the outcomes of the 2 WUA surveys discussed above, being short-term, reveal 
no major breakthroughs in the quality of irrigation services by the newly established WUAs. 
However, institutional interventions coupled with social mobilization among water users  
somewhat improved the head-tail inequities in water distribution. (Yakubov, 2004, 2005). 
Crop yields, specific water supply and water productivity by canal units  
 
The impact of the IWRM project interventions on agricultural production is an important indicator 
of its acceptability by water users and producers of the crops. The two major crops grown in 
SFC command area are cotton and wheat, both under a state quota system. In 2001, which was 
used as baseline year (pre-intervention), the average cotton yield was 3.2 ton/ha and wheat 
yield was 5.8 ton/ha.  The yields for both cotton and wheat were higher in the upstream areas of 
the canal and lower in the downstream (table 6).  
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The highest cotton yield in 2001 (3.8 ton/ha) was recorded in the Bulakbashi district of Andijan 
province at the head end of the SFC. The lowest yield for cotton at 2.8 ton/ha was registered in 
Ferghana district of the Ferghana province which is in the tail end of the SFC. Similarly, the 
wheat yields were highest  in the Bulakbashi district (7.4 ton/ha) and lowest in the Ferghana 
district (4.8 ton/ha). Overall, before the project the head-located districts obtained higher yields 
for both cotton and wheat. 
 
 




Crop yields for 2002-2005 were analyzed by canal hydrounits. Average cotton yields declined 
dramatically in 2003, immediately after the IWRM Ferghana interventions started and then 
started to recover. In 2002 average cotton yields for SFC were 3.2 ton/ha. In the following year it 
declined to 2.5 ton/ha with slight increase in 2004 to 2.8 ton/ha. The recovery continued in 2005 
with the yields averaging 2.9 ton/ha. In 2005, the highest cotton yield recorded was 3.8 ton/ha at 
hydrounit 1, while the lowest at hydrounit 7 (2.3 ton/ha), i.e. at the head and tail ends of the 
SFC, respectively. In 2003, the yield of cotton was at its highest (3.3 ton/ha) again in the head-
end hydrounit 2 and at its lowest at 1.3 ton/ha in the tail-located hydrounit 7. The same trend 
was again observed in 2004 and 2005 with the yields at their highest (3.3 ton/ha) in hydrounit 2 
and at their lowest, though slightly improved at 1.9 and 2 ton/ha in hydrounits 7 and 4, 
respectively (table 6).  Thus, the general trend for cotton yields until 2005 shows no change 
after IWRM Ferghana interventions with the head-located commands featuring higher yields and 
those in the tail – the lowest . However, in 2005 this trend started changing with the hydrounits 
in the tail reaches of SFC showing higher yields than those in the middle.  
 
 
 Insert: Table 7. Cotton and Wheat Yields in the SFC command area in 2002-2005  
(after IWRM Ferghana interventions) 
 
 
Average wheat yields declined in all years following the introduction of the new water 
management mechanisms, from 6.7 ton/ha in 2002 to 5.7 ton/ha in year 2005. During the early 
stages of the interventions (2002-2003) the highest wheat yields were found at the middle of the 
SFC and later at the head of the SFC. Over the whole period of study (2002-2005) the lowest 
wheat yields were recorded at the tail ends of canal command area. The yields of two major 
crops were disturbed after the IWRM Ferghana interventions. The initial decline of the cotton 
yields recovered by the following year whereas wheat yields did not.  
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Figure 10 presents water delivery information by administrative unit along SFC over the period 
of 2000-2001, when water management was administrative. Political districts are arranged from 
the head to tail of SFC. Average water delivery for this period was equal to 1078 mm, with a 
maximum of 2400 mm for the most downstream district Ezyovon, in Ferghana province and the 
lowest of 350 mm for the Markhamat district of the Andijan province.  Seven districts out of 
eleven performed very similarly,  having 1000-1100 mm average depth supplied.  Interestingly, 
the water distribution pattern at the tail was more favorable, or perhaps excessive, compared to 
the head reaches.  This happened because the CMO organization mainly disciplined 
(controlled) water users located in head and middle part of the canal,leaving absolutely 
uncontrolled tail areas. This situation contributed to increased water tables, excessive drainage 
formation and waterlogging in the tail areas of the canal.  
 
 
Figure 10. Specific water supply by administrative units before reforms (2000-2001) 
 
 
Figure 11 depicts the specific water supply after IWRM Ferghana project interventions. The 
average specific water supply for this period was 1120 mm, which is slightly higher than the pre-
intervention average. The uniformity of the water delivery improved noticeably at the end of the 
monitoring period.  The previous variabilty in specific water supply rates between different 
hydrounits reduced and tail-head differences disappeared. However,  there is some 




Figure 11. Specific water supply by administrative units before reforms (2000-2001) 
 
 
Overall, water deliveries were more uniform after the changes in management introduced by the 
project. The gap between maximum and minimum water delivery rates declined dramatically, 
and the tail-head inequalities decreased. However, the middle reaches of SFC received  200-





The  current crises  in the water sector have revealed the limitations of institutions in dealing 
effectively with the new set of problems related more to resource allocation and management 
than to resource development (Saleth and Dinar, 2004). Water management institutions and 
organizations cannot be seen apart from what people do. They are constantly shaped and re-  27
shaped through people’s practices (Mehta et al., 1999). The need for water resources 
management reform in Central Asia was determined by the socio-economic changes that 
occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly by the transition from a collectivized 
farm system to different type of smaller size farming (Ul Hassan et al. 2005).  
 
Attempts to re-activate water management institutions in the new economic and social setting  
began in the late 20
th century in many parts of the world (Hazi.1998, Rosegrant and 
Gazmuri.1994, Barraque et al.1998, Correia at al.1998, Adam.1997, World Bank.1994, 
Yaron.1997, Ke Lidan.1997). In Central Asia, the transformation of the water sector to fit a new 
agricultural setting lagged behind. Fragmentation of previously large collective farm units was 
not matched by supporting changes in irrigation water management.  The  regulated economy in 
agriculture - state quotas and  fixed prices below market levels for cotton and wheat - still 
remained unchanged. The irrigation water management in the region has always followed in the 
footsteps of agriculture. Therefore, changes in the agricultural sector happened first.  
Governments first started disbanding the old farming system rather than filling the subsequent 
institutional gap in on–farm water management that followed. For quite a long time  (5 to 7 
years), on-farm water management was neglected, resulting in chaos and many problems.  
 
The Swiss Development Cooperation in Central Asia started funding activities aimed at 
improving irrigation water management through institutional reform and wider public involvement 
(SDC. 2004). The IWRM Ferghana project has introduced a new set of irrigation water 
institutions in post –independent Central Asia. The philosophy of the project was to sustain a 
scheme of water management through hydrographic management and the inclusion of water 
users in irrigation management. Before the project, the SFC canal was split in two and managed 
by two different provincial WMOs, organized along territorial boundaries. Water management 
decisions were dominated by territorial interest and needs. As a result, conflicts and friction over 
water were commonplace among the districts.  
 
The changes introduced through the IWRM Ferghana project in 2002 were relatively rapid. 
Within one year, an independent SFC management organization was established and its water 
management structure was transformed from territorial to hydrographic jurisdictions and from a 
paternalistic organization to a more open, user represented’ semi-public one. The goal of the 
interventions was to make water distribution between all water users more equitable. Public 
participation in water resources management is a completely new concept to both water 
managers and users who for years lived under top-down and administrative management 
setting.  The project interventions endeavoured to catch up with the continuing agricultural 
reforms through facilitation and creating right incentives to nurture bottom up approaches and   28
initiative when organizing water users and other stakeholders into groups, associations and 
water committees or unions at all levels of the water management hierarchy.  
 
The temporal and spatial analysis of delivery performance ratio (DPR) for SFC was used to 
assess the impact of the institutional changes on water distribution. The results suggest that 
there are real changes that have had a positive impact on uniformity of water distribution, 
reducing the excessive water delivery, a common practice in the pre-intervention period. If 
weighted average of DPR for the pre-intervention period was estimated at 1.97, then throughout 
the intervention period this indicator came down to 1.20, which is classed as moderate water 
distribution performance (FAO.)  The IWRM Ferghana intervention has also resulted in an 
unexpected decline in water delivery, increasing the number of cases with extremely low DPRs.  
This normally happens towards the end of the crop season and could reflect poor planning of 
actual needs at the start of the season. A spatial improvement in DPRs was observed from 
values fluctuating  from 1.08 to 9.56 pre-project, falling into the range of 1.00 and 1.53, 
afterwards – suggesting an improvement in performance. Better timeliness was also observed. 
We conclude that, due to the project interventions, the number of excessive water delivery 
cases was considerably reduced and moderate water distribution performance achieved over a 
broader area.  
 
To assess the impacts of IWRM Ferghana project interventions on water users, 2 surveys were 
conducted in one of the exemplary  WUAs  located along the South Ferghana canal. The survey 
indicated that there are positive changes in timeliness and adequacy of water supply to water 
users, though problems with stability of water level in some watercourses still persist. The yields 
for major crops such as cotton and wheat in the SFC command area revealed no overall 
changes during the intervention period. However, spatial differences in crop yields between 
canal reaches have greatly decreased. The average depth of water applied in different units of 
SFC became more uniform in the intervention period. This is a very good indicator of the impact 
of institutional changes on water distribution.  
A major concern though remains about the sustainability of new institutions, especially those 
representing the water users. The Canal Water Committees (CWCs) can play an important role 
in scheme management to ensure more equal water distribution. This function has been so far 
operationalized through regular coordination between the CMO and the CWC on 10-day water 
distribution schedules. The CWC represents water users (both irrigation and non-irrigation) in all 
canal management matters through democratically elected representatives. However, due to 
the large size of SFC’s command area, this single umbrella body may struggle to be effective in   29
the future. Therefore, we propose that additional CWC’s should be  formed at each hydrounit of 
SFC and then federated at the entire canal level.  
 
The analysis confirms that even partial changes in irrigation water management of the countries 
in transition, especially in Central Asia can bring positive changes in water distribution . 
However, these changes have greater weigth in voicing water users’ needs when making water 
distribution decisions at the main canal level than in using water more effectively at field level. It 
is worth noting also that SFC is located in Uzbekistan, a country featuring strong central 
government control and a quota system in agricultural production. So proper ground work and 
consultation in the form of well-planned social mobilization campaigns among major 
stakeholders can effect changes that really work, even if the overall agro-economic system is 
distorted.  
 
For the last 10-12 years, Uzbekistan has been trying to create more effective farming system 
through its land reform and the replacement of former collective farms. However, the water 
sector has been failing so far to keep pace. This case study provides a concrete and detailed 
example of a model that has great potential to be applied to the enormous number of main 
canals servicing the Ferghana Valley, and in other systems where hundreds of main canals like 
SFC exist in Uzebkistan and elsewhere in Central Asia.  The replication of  the experience of 
this study in those canals in Uzbekistan and in Central Asia as a  whole will bring long-expected 
sustainability in irrigation water management. The approach described in this study will help to 
equalize irrigation water distribution to the large numbers of new, individual new water users, 
emerging due to agricultural and land reforms. The inclusion of water users will also bring more 
transperant practices and as result reduce the transaction costs of water management. The 
implementation of the above approach on a basin scale will require a huge efforts to mobilize 
water users and re-organize the irrigation water management structure. Water allocation 
approaches should also be revised with more inclusion of water users’ voice in the process. 
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